Boston Globe Editorial - Putin's new power play

Boston Globe Editorial - Putin's new power play
Copyright by The Boston Globe
Published: September 13, 2007


Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, has a propensity for springing surprises. His latest was the brusque removal of Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov and his replacement by the hitherto obscure financial regulator Viktor Zubkov. Russians properly assume that the move is part of Putin's plan for selecting his own successor, someone who can be rubber-stamped in presidential elections next March and counted on to preserve the current political system.

But Putin's shuffling of premiers also reinforces a czar-like cult of power. It says: We can elevate anyone we please, dispense with whomever we like, and our subjects have no choice but to applaud our caprice. Each time this ritual of Putinesque fiat and popular obedience is repeated, the reflexes of command and submission are implanted more deeply in the Russian body politic.

With parliamentary elections coming in December and the presidential balloting scheduled for March, Putin appears intent on avoiding lame-duck status and preserving his unchallenged authority as long as possible. Ushering in a new government under Zubkov, a dependable 65-year-old loyalist, frees Putin to anoint someone else as his successor and to make that choice at the last possible moment.

In this way, Putin may not only prolong the succession contest between his two first deputy prime ministers, the former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and Gazprom's chairman, Dmitri Medvedev, but also prevent power flowing prematurely to either one - or to some dark horse candidate. If one of the obvious contenders had been placed in the premier's post - as Putin was by his predecessor Boris Yeltsin - the Kremlin courtiers would be drawn to that dauphin like iron filings to a magnet.

Above all, these palace intrigues highlight the opacity of the power system Putin has put in place since he succeeded Yeltsin in 2000. Putin remains popular with the Russian public because windfall oil and natural gas profits have filled Kremlin coffers, creating reserves of nearly a half trillion dollars, which trickle down as increased pensions, urban building booms, and job creation. After the economic collapse of the late-1990s and the disarray of Yeltsin's final years, the populace also appears to appreciate Putin's molding of a strong state.

But Putin has shaped an opaque, autocratic system, and perpetuating it is not healthy for Russia or the rest of the world. Under that system, Russia suffers from pervasive corruption, demographic decline, and a political culture of rank gangsterism. The proper therapy for these ills is the sunshine of transparent, accountable democracy. Russia needs another Gorbachev, a leader who grasps the need for a new perestroika.